to let Ahmad Beg know of their presence and visit his 622
[illegible], or he will think they look down on his hospital- 579
ity, or, worse, do not know him or recognize him as a
chieftain."

Save for the question of hospitality, it may be seen 423
from the section on administration that the government 649
takes a strong interest in chieftains' activities. The
state lays claim to all unregistered land, [illegible], which
includes a large amount of "tribal" and village territory,
and would prefer to collect taxes directly from the pro-
ducers, thus cutting off the most important source of
aristocratic revenue. Some of the chieftains, almost of
the times, have attempted to have tribal lands registered
in their own names. The execution of the law belongs to 649
the government, either the civil code of the judge or the 642
tribal code of the [illegible]. Vengeance is also of the [642]
state, and homicides are to be handled by the police and
the courts, rather than the vendetta. Safeguard and
sanctuary in a well-policed district are thought to be
unnecessary. Modern Iraq is in concept democratic, and [584]
such titles as [illegible], beg, or [illegible], while they are widely
used, do not enjoy the sanction of law. The army and the
constabulary are thought adequate to handle military
exigencies, and the arming of a populace, particularly
[illegible] of bodyguards, is considered superfluous, if not
dangerous. Thus the Kurdish aristocracy has lost many of 525
its important functions and perquisites. They are no longer 174
[illegible] in war or administration, and much of their

3:Barth E-5 (1951) 1954 MA11 Kurd MA11

and in the same area possibly also among some Caucasian groups.[4] However, though marriage patterns do not function to define the relations between lineages, this does not mean that marriage relations and material ties have lacked any relevance of a structural or specifically political nature. The present paper presents an hypothesis regarding these implications in the Kurdish lineage organization, specifically the meaning of a pattern of father's brother's daughter marriage, for the consideration of students working with similar problems in the Middle East.

Features of Kurdish culture and society have been described elsewhere,[5] but might be summarized briefly. The Kurds are a linguistic and ethnic group, nearly exclusively Muslim by religion, totalling some three million people.[6] They occupy a semi-continuous territory along the hills and mountains east and north of the Fertile Crescent, divided between the modern states of Persia, Iraq, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Syria. Some few groups of Kurds have remained nomadic till the present day, following their herds of sheep, goats, and large cattle into the mountains in the summer and down on the plains in the winter. The great majority are today subsistence farmers, many of whom practice a pattern of localized transhumance. The present discussion relates to the southern districts of Iraq Kurdistan, where material was collected in the field from February to August, 1951.

Two basic types of organization were found: a tribal system, based on descent, and a feudal system, based on class and land ownership. The latter is progressively becoming assimilated into the modern structure of the state of Iraq; the former, a patrilineal lineage system, survives only among the nomads and a minority of the farmers in the more isolated territories.

Kurdish tribal organization is a segmentary lineage organization of very simple type. The largest kinship unit, the tira, is a maximal lineage, divisible into segments according to the charter of patrilineal descent. The genealogical depth of the tira varies. For the sedentary Hamawands (location: Kirkuk Liwa, Iraq), the apical ancestor is nine generations removed from the present adult generation; for the nomadic Warda Shwe (location: summering in Sulaimani Liwa, Iraq), twelve generations.

Several tira may be united, though not necessarily, in a political confederacy of variable endurance, the most important in southern Kurdistan being at present

4 Lewis J. Lindwall, *Marriage and the Family in Caucasia* (Vienna, 1931).

5 V. F. Minorsky, "Kurds and Kurdistan" in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, London, 1913); E. B. Soane, *Social and Economic Organization of the Hamawand Kurds* (Monographs in Social Anthropology, no. 1, London, 1940); Frederik Barth, *Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan* (Universitetets Etnografiske Museum, Bulletin no. 7, Oslo, 1953).

6 *The Middle East* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1950).

3: Barth E-5 (1951) 1954 MA11 Kurd MA11

the Jaf confederacy of nomadic as well as sedentary tirza. The following discussion will, for the sake of simplicity, relate only to the Hamawands, an independent tira of population ca. 1000-1500, which became sedentary some two or three generations ago.

The lineage organization has two main areas of relevance: land ownership, and defence and offence in war. Property rights to land and grazing area are held jointly by the tira as a whole; exclusive usufruct rights are vested in its localized segments, inhabiting compact villages with a population of 50 to 200 individuals. Within the village territory, men have traditional rights to certain fields. These rights are passed on from father to son, but are not inalienable, and land is freely redistributed by the village council when the need arises. If a segment becomes extinct, its territory passes as normal inheritance to the other segments of the lineage, according to the degrees of kinship (in any one level of segmentation, "brothers" exclude "cousins" from inheritance).

Further, until successful pacification in 1932, the lineage was, and still is potentially, also a military unit, mobilized in toto if a segment were attacked from without, and divided in opposition according to the segmentary charter when conflicts arose within the group. Conflicts relating to territorial rights were rife, both within, where they led to fission, and without, where they led to conquest or loss of territory.

There is a clear contrast between the Kurdish and most African systems in the readiness with which the problems of fusion and fission are solved. A man's rights to land are limited to the territory of the village segment of his lineage; a stranger or a person from another lineage segment is accepted into a village only as hired farm help ("nqasi") of degraded status. The territorial exclusiveness of lineage segments thus tends to be maintained to high degree, and there are no kinship mechanisms for developing "attached" lineages with local territorial and political rights.[7] The segmentary nature of the maximal lineage expresses itself directly in geographical distribution, and the respective territories of major and minor segments, inhabited nearly exclusively by them, down to the village level, can be plotted on a map or clearly seen where one has a view of the valley bottom. The main integrative factors relevant to segments larger than the village seem to be territorial contiguity, knowledge of common descent, and the importance of the tira as a defensive unit—this last probably being of most weight. No religious or ritual

[7] A permanent relationship may occasionally be established between a conquering lineage group and a conquered, non-tribal peasant population, who retain certain rights as serfs of the ruling lineage. In these cases, a caste barrier is set up, preventing intermarriage between the two groups. This relationship, observed on the northern margins of Hamawand territory, does not seem to be very stable.

5: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

the idealistic spirit of the time, was at first to avoid commitments in the hills by setting up one or more semi-autonomous Kurdish provinces to be loosely attached to whatever regular administration might eventually be established in the plains. Even before the armistice contact had been established with a certain Shaykh Mahmud, head of the leading Sayyid family of Southern Kurdistan, who was informed that any Kurdish groups or tribes in the three *liwas* of Sulaimani, Kirkuk and Arbil which might wish to accept his leadership would be allowed to do so. It soon became evident, however, that the Sayyid had overestimated his popularity, and his province was eventually restricted to little more than the *liwa* of Sulaimani. No similar initiative was taken in regard to the Kurdish districts in the *liwa* of Mosul, where there was no articulate Kurdish opinion.

This first experiment in Kurdish autonomy under modern conditions was not a success. Within six months the Shaykh, resenting the limitations placed on his freedom to do exactly as he liked, rebelled. After a short military operation he was captured and deported, and the *liwa* was brought under the direct administration of the Occupation Authority. But quite apart from Shaykh Mahmud's personal ambitions there was always present at Sulaimani, among all classes of the population, an abiding conviction, rooted in their history, that the place contained the germs of a revived and extensive Kurdish state of which it was the predestined capital. The belief had little justification either in its physical appearance and commercial importance or in the academic attainments and political experience of its citizens, but it was always in the air. The proposal that Sulaimani with the adjacent districts should once more become an autonomous territory, therefore, had not come to the people as anything strange.

For the other political leaders the fall of Mahmud was thus no reason for renouncing the glittering prize brought so near by the Treaty of Sèvres. Assurances had been given in the British Parliament that the Kurds would not be forced to come under an Arab government against their will, and when the Provisional National Government of Iraq was formed in November, 1920, Sulaimani remained under the direct control of the British High Commissioner. Kirkuk (which then included Arbil) did accept a *Mutasarrif* (Governor) nominated by the new government, but he, like all the other officials, was a local man, and Turkish, the language of the educated urban classes (but not of the majority of the inhabitants), continued to be used for official purposes. When in June, 1921, the Amir Faysal arrived in Iraq as the candidate sponsored by the British Government for the throne Sulaimani refused to participate in the referendum; Kirkuk did participate but accounted for most of the

7: Barth 8-8 (1951) 1953 Will Kurd Will

the last of the leaders to follow the nomads on their annual migrations. Today the 2—3000 who have remained nomads receive only slight attention. A description of the *Jaf Beg* at the time of Rich, (op. cit.) in 1820, pictures him with considerable sympathy as a powerful and despotic patriarchal ruler. A similar exhalted position is indicated for 1908 by Soane's description of the *Pasha* receiving the first cucumbers of the season, rushed to him on a foaming horse over some 10 dusty kilometres. (Soane, 1912, p. 207).

An important institution reinforcing the powers of the Begzade is the *Pyshtmala* (= around-the-house), a group of men recruited from all *tiras*, who protect and perform services in the home of the *Beg*, and used to serve as bodyguard. As well as constituting a type of levied tax, this group paralleled the Viking *hird* in form and function, being constantly at hand to maintain the *Beg's* position, effectively and immediately executing his orders. The composite origin of the group, and the fact that it included members of *all tiras*, made the *Pyshtmala* more readily subject to discipline than a group recruited on *any* other principles, and exercised the *Beg* from the need to create dangerous factionalism and initiate feud by using one traditional *tira* organization to control an other.

The functions of the Jaf confederacy, and the reasons for its permanence where similar organizations among settled people have been at best very ephemeral, pose interesting problems. Presumably, the direct advantages to all the nomads of a larger confederacy have always been evident enough to encourage submission to the central authority of the *Begs*. These advantages were considerably greater for the nomads than they would be for the settled tribes. Firstly, since all the property of the nomad is movable, he may lose everything if he is raided, where the farmer at worst loses one year's crop. Secondly, a high degree of concentration of population is possible in temporary tent-*camps*, whereas the agriculturalists necessarily live in smaller, more widely scattered communities. Given the social mechanism, there were thus no physical obstacles to large groups of nomads driving their flocks together and uniting for defence in times of strife while the villagers, to protect their property, were forced to remain scattered over the countryside. Thirdly, a larger

7: Barth 8-5 (1951) 1955 WAII Band WAII

organized unit gave a direct economic advantage to the nomads in their relations with the settled populations. The *Jal*, by commercializing men and animals, were able to descend on whole valleys, tyrannizing the local villagers by their larger numbers, and finally graze their flocks on pastures and fields belonging to the settled people.

This confederacy was admittedly not based on any lineage principle of common descent, since it covers among its members common ties; yet all *Jal* insist that the ruling position of the *Begnada* lineage has never been questioned. The fact that a central core of royal *Jal*s can trace common descent surely contributes to stability. Furthermore, the *Begnada* group may have been large enough so there would constantly be a number of pretenders to the position as leader of the *ashrut*. Thus, if the pressure of exploitation became too great, the commoners could give their support to a competing pretender within the royal lineage, who would then be in a position to gain ascendancy.

The formal position of the *Jal Begnada* is thus conceptually different from that of the *Ratten* of the separate tents. The leaders of these and their segments are acclaimed, and should ideally base their power on informal sanctions. This consensual type of authority seems to be inherent in the principles on which a segmentary lineage organization is based. E. g. Peters (1951) discusses the organization of the Cyrenaica Bedouin in terms of the opposition of lineage segments of a like order of segmentation, and emphasizes the absence of a real *hierarchy* of political offices. Any Bedouin sheikh of a primary section must necessarily also belong to a specific secondary and tertiary section within it, and he can function as informal leader of the other sub-sections in his primary section only when it is in opposition to *another* primary section; in other situations, the unity of the primary section breaks down. The only way leadership can be stabilized and a hierarchy of authority established is by divorcing the super-ordinated leader and his group from the segmentary structure of the tribe as a whole. This is achieved in the case of the *Jal Begnada* by elevating that whole lineage group to a semi-royal status. In relation to the Cyrenaica Bedouin, the Senussi may for a time have occupied a structurally somewhat similar position (cf. Evans-Pri-

§40 chard, 1949). The presence of the *Jat Begzade* as political heads
• §41. necessarily affects the internal organization of the various *Jat* tîre, and the segmentary nature of the lineage organization is therefore not expressed fully. Each *Kate* becomes de-facto vested with some authority as the representative of the permanently established *Jat Begzade*, and the political structure is thus actually a compromise between a truly segmentary lineage organization and a hierarchical organization.

§42. As far as its formal structure goes, the *Jat* confederacy seems extremely similar to the political system of the early Mongols, as described e. g. by Haslam. The prominence of Chengish Khan's lineage is phrased by him in terms of the ramification of other descent groups, to emphasize that all the subjects of the Khan were considered as the vassals not of the ruler but of his family and his close kinsmen as represented by him» (*op. cit.*, p. 92). Essentially the same might well be said of the relation between the tîre of the *Jat* confederacy and their *Begzade* lineage. It is interesting to speculate whether, since the political mechanism seems to be present, it was merely the difficulties of topography that prevented the *Jat* and similar Kurdish confederacies from forming the larger units that one finds in the Central Asian steppe area.

§42 §43 §48 The immediate modifications in *Jat* formal structure made necessary by the adoption of sedentary life and agriculture are slight, though the meanings and importance attaching to the various aspects of the organization change radically. Generally, each *Khel* settles in a part of the old tîre pasture, and the informal head of the *Khel* becomes the formally elected *kehkhe* (mayor or headman) of the resulting village. Any one tîre thus tends to split up completely, some *Khels* settling at the winter camp sites around Qizil Robat, others 80 km. N.E. on the autumn campsite of Shahr-i-nav. Whereas tribal unity thus loses its significance, each village is regarded as the property of one or another of the *Begzade*, and *Jat* identification, as well as the acceptance of *Begzade* leadership, is natural.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE HAMAWAND.

According to their own traditions, the Hamawands entered Southern Kurdistan from Persia as nomadic herdsmen. Seizing the opportunities offered by the ineffectual nature of Ottoman governmental control, they entered on a career of brigandage, looting the caravans that passed between Persia and Iraq. The enemy relations between the Persian and Ottoman empires made this all the more feasible, since any activity detrimental to one power had the covert support of the other. Though the Hamawands later settled in villages, they did not immediately take up agriculture, except for small garden patches of melons etc. As they proudly assert: after more than a generation we reaped our daily bread with our gunbarrels. All accounts by early travellers describe how this small group terrorized the district by striking quickly and effectively in widely separated areas. Only after the First World War did their economy become truly based on farming. Through this turbulent history, tribal political organization retained its importance, and some features of the system may be seen very clearly.

The Hamawand group as a whole is regarded as one *tîre* of the same magnitude as the various components *Jaf tîras*. Even in its greatest period of glory, the Hamawand *tîre* could muster no more than 200-300 horsemen, implying a total population of 1,000-1,500 individuals. The process of branching has however been initiated; in fact, as compared to the Jaf, the Hamawand political structure seems to be based on a clearer political recognition of the segmentation into lineage sections which follows from the marriage pattern. The hierarchy of progressively more inclusive lineage segments, from the single village level (population 50—100) and up to the maximal lineage group, is given political significance.

There is no single leader of the whole Hamawand *tîre*[1]; questions concerning the group as a whole are discussed and decided in a council made up of the *Aghas* (=headmen) of the 4 primary branches. Each of these branches are again divided into sub-branches,

[1] Actually, Mohammed Amin Agha of the Bapirdo claims paramount position.

• [illegible] and so on ending at the village level. The leader of any category of group is called *Agha*, any branch or named section thereof will in certain contexts be called a *tira*.

The genealogy of these branches is traced, but varies somewhat from villages to village. Such variations derive partly from the lack of interest in collateral units, partly from an attempt to stress certain relationships or to construct a more flattering genealogy.

Descent is traced in male line from the common ancestor Hamma, the founder or the tira, nine generations removed from the present



Diagram No. 4. A Tergah model of their position in the Hamawand kinship organization.

adult group. The origins of Hamma, having no political significance to the group, are of little interest to the villagers, though Arabic origin is occasionally claimed for its prestige value.

One version was collected in the village of Kani Sard: Hamma had 4 sons, Sofiar, Yadjar, Rashid, and Ramezan; from these are descended the 4 major branches of the group. The villagers themselves claim to be Yadjar. They could indicate the areas where the descendants of the three other sons live, but were unable or unconcerned in tracing relations in any greater detail.

In the village of Tergah, a somewhat different version was given. The major branches were named as Ramewand, Sofarwand, Rashe-

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 WA11 Kurd WA11

and, named political positions, however, is concerned with an opposition between positions as a sort of stereotype. The relative grading of formal political positions is vaguely defined, and the individuals of a village, through competing for the positions, will align in opposed subordination according to this grading. Those certain ill defined demands and powers are objectified (and therefore more readily subsumed to) from persons occupying such positions. This manner of organized and generally unquestioned power is the authority that belongs with the particular position. The authority is thus not derived from the per-sonne, as it would if it were an office; it is brought to it. Persons occupying the position may at times not be able to exert it; nevertheless, in the formal political organization, this authority and degree of ability to apply sanctions of some kind is assumed.

These considerations are applicable to both the tribal and the non-tribal political systems, and modify the impression that these systems take. The evident differences between Kurdish tribal and non-tribal structure are thus reduced, and the Kurdish segmentary lineage organization becomes in its actual application more similar to the Kurdish non-tribal organization than to the classical segmentary organizations, exemplified above by the Cyrenaica Bedouin. When combined with this principle of universal application of status differences, the segmentary structure of the lineage offers the framework for a hierarchical organization of leaders of segments. And these segments are residential and territorial units, as are the units in the non-tribal system. In the following, then, Kurdish lineage organization will be seen as a hierarchy of leaders of groups of narrowing genealogical spread, rather than in the classical manner as whole segments in opposition.

The general characteristics of Kurdish political systems correspond in many ways to those of the *traditional* system of Max Weber (*op. cit.*). The rules governing the various positions in the hierarchy are not enacted, they are traditionally defined. «The order underlying a system of traditional authority always defines a system of statuses of persons who can legitimately exercise authority». The concept of the *office* is undeveloped: «Such a status is different from an office». It does not involve specifically defined powers with

7: Earth · 8-5 (1951) 2953 Hill Hard HAll

• 642 the presumption that everything was legitimized in terms of the
659 order is outside its scope. As long as the members of such a
status does not act counter to the traditional order, ... loyalty is
due, not to 'the order', but to him personally.» (Forman, op. cit.,
p. 121).

The main contrast between the Kurdish system and this «ideal-typical» type lies in the implication in the definition of the latter that concrete traditional prescriptions are indeed accepted and agreed upon by all. The cultural heterogeneity of the South Kurdish area has been emphasized above; this heterogeneity makes for a situation where a truly traditional system can not operate. Any single concrete traditional prescription ought to be questioned by all but a minority, and conflicting interpretations of what is in fact the traditional order are constantly advanced. As a result, the theme of power attains an overriding importance, following the line of reasoning that if you can get away with something, it can't be very wrong. The effective check on excesses in the use of power is the threat of
681 revolt. Though there is obviously much more control with these actions, Kurds are rightly famous for being «trigger-happy», and a person who strongly feels that his rights have been infringed upon may go to great lengths to retaliate. Since no institutional means exist, violence has become institutionalized as the only mechanism at hand.

[78 It is tempting to see the present situation as the result of break-
642 downs of a formerly functioning traditional system. There is considerable evidence indicating that Southern Kurdistan some 100 years ago was better integrated than today, in the form of a strongly
[79 feudal Pashalik centering around Sulaimani. The Baban Pashas of
643 Sulaimani had frequent opportunities during conflicts with both the Persian and the Ottoman rulers to show that they had the unquestioning support of an overriding majority of the population, and through several centuries of rule they built up a traditional hierarchy of hereditary status positions, assisting persons to political offices (Rich op. cit., p. 111). The traditional nature of the rule is strikingly brought out in the following citation, where the Pasha of Sulaimani explains the solidarity that his subjects feel towards him by contrast-

?: Barth 8-5 (1951) 1953 Mill Hurd Mill

ng his form of rule to that of the feudal europe in Siena, Persia. "You are not the lord of a tribe, nor are your men your tribesmen. You may divide them, feed them, and make them rich, but they are not your cousins, they are but your servants" (ibid, p. 84).

When Bahtu rule was broken in 1871, Ottoman legal practice as well as personal ambition found a footing in the area. This contributed further to the breakdown of traditional principles, since it offered individuals the opportunity to manipulate the two different systems, traditional usage and Ottoman legal code, to their own advantage. The most profoundly affected land tenure. All land, unless otherwise registered, was deemed to belong to the Ottoman Sultan. Though the rule existed that no whole village should be registered as the property of any single person, this and other rules were generally overlooked. Thus leaders of clans, Begs, or in fact any other person who could bribe a few witnesses, registered large tracts of land as their personal property. Although actual power was of course necessary to make these formal transactions effective so far as the collecting of tax was concerned, the result was that a category of landowner emerged for which there were no clear traditional precedents, and their claims, when supported by power and supported Ottoman land code, could not truly be disputed. As a result, the field was left open to individual exploitation on a much larger scale than in Bahtu times, and the only effective checks were the above mentioned threats to the personal safety of the exploiter.

COMPOSITE COMMUNITIES

In the Hamawand area, some local groups are found today where tribally organized Hamawand exploit a non-tribal tenant population (*Mzeijin*) as a serf group. Such situations have come about by recent military conquest, and show incipient developments of a caste system. Certain aspects of organization have been developed by the Hamawand as an adjustment to this situation.

The Hamawand formal political structure already outlined was also a military hierarchy of command. Each village was expected to muster a group of horsemen, usually 10—11, led by the village *Agha*, as a fighting unit in the Hamawand army. Each of these soldiers,

tribal system would be by demonstrating (or inventing) genealogical connection. This can hardly be done on any grand scale where common residence is virtually impossible, except as based on a relationship of conqueror and conquered.

As a result, the Kurdish tribal village retains a high degree of lineage unity, reckoned strictly patrilineally, as compared to Nuer villages. The Kurd who leaves his tribal territory, or even village, can obtain no political power in his new environment, therefore has minimal prestige, and thus tends to remain with his lineage group. But because of this, the Kurdish lineage system has not the adaptability of the Nuer system, and breaks down in a situation of conquest or external administration.

4.42 ORGANIZATION OF THE BABAN POLITICAL STRUCTURE

In the light of these miniature examples from Hamawand territory today, some of the characteristics of the old Baban rule become much clearer. The Baban themselves were not a *tira*, but a cooptative lineage of the same type as the *Jaf Begzade*, ultimately derived from the *Sokkir tira* of the Pushdir area. Their power, however was based on the tribally organized groups, and a majority of the villages seem to have been controlled in the fashion of the above Hamawand villages, with a basic split between a ruling, tribally organized soldiery caste and a non-tribal peasant population. This supervision was clearly recognized by Rich in 1820, and in his lists of the populations of the Pushdir, only the Pushdir area is described as wholly tribal, the other districts are mixed. Some inhabitants are of the peasant, some of the clansmish race (= tribally organized), i. e., no village has inhabitants of one exclusive kind.» (Rich op. cit., p. 290). The tribally organized minority was employed by the Pasha to control the larger population: «. . . it would never do for him (Omar Agha, one of the feudal lords under the Pasha) to keep the citizen or peasant caste in his service. They never grow much attached, nor will they stand by you in any difficulties. The clansman (= tribal Kurd), on the contrary, though not of your own clan (= *tira*), grows warmly attached to you; and then neither hunger, thirst,

642 poverty, fatigue, nor danger, ever afflict him or separate him from
175 you" (ibid., p. 143-4).

A tentative reconstruction of the formal organization of the Baban Pashalik suggested by this is schematically represented below, diagram No. 6.



Diagram No. 6. Formal organization of the Baban Pashalik.

642
158 THE CHARISMA OF THE LEADER

In the formal political organization, principles and social segments derived both from the lineage system and the feudal system can thus be combined, and a more complex structure created. This is made all the more possible because of the similar expectancies attached to the person of the leader in both these systems. The qualifications and impediments to leadership will be discussed more fully in a later section, p. 119; however, some of the characteristics of the formal organization derive from the nature of leadership in Kurdish culture,

7: North 8-5 (1951) 1953 9511 Sard 9511

and can not be understood or divorced from the total person of the leader.

The interplay of structural and personal factors in defining the position and power of the leader, and thus the specific form of the political organization, may best be illustrated by the history of Shaikh Mahmud[1]), a leader of considerable importance. His emergence as Malik or King of Kurdistan after the First World War, frequently misrepresented or given a biased account in English sources, is the most outstanding feature of political development in Southern Kurdistan in the present century. He constitutes the charismatic leader scheduled by Max Weber (op. cit.) and others to appear upon the breakdown of an established order. The variety of the sources of political power, as well as the importance of the person and the vagueness in the definition of the office in the Kurdish system, are here clearly exemplified.

The family of Shaikh Mahmud traces its origin from two learned brothers, theologians, who arrived in Kurdistan from Persia some 170 years ago. Due to descent from Mohammed and a tradition of sanctity, the family retained a spiritually leading position. The immediate founder of the present lineage is Koka Hamma, revered as a saint in Sulaimani. During the centuries of Baban rule, the Shaikhs remained divorced from politics; their wealth grew slowly from accumulated gifts of land and villages, especially from the Baban themselves.

With the political instability and disorganization following the end of Baban rule, Shaikh Said, the father of Shaikh Mahmud, entered actively into the conflicts, and asserted his secular powers in the area through a successful combination of violence and diplomacy. Competing factions attempted to have him deposed by arranging for him to be called to Istanbul by Sultan Abdul Hamid. The Sultan, being extremely wary of overt intrigue, frequently preferred to seek his support among outsiders, and the meeting was a great success from Shaikh Said's point of view, effectually reinforcing his position. Shaikh Said was murdered in Mosul in 1919, and succeeded by his son Shaikh Mahmud.

[1]) It should be noted that the term Shaikh in Kurdish is not a political title, but merely indicates descent from the Prophet.

Upon his accession to leadership in the Sheikh family, Sheikh Ali Mahmud continued his father's policy with great force. Southern Kurdistan was at the time in a state of anarchy, large areas had been depopulated, the old trade and pilgrim routes were largely closed by brigands, especially by the Hamawands, who successfully challenged Ottoman supremacy in the face of large punitive expeditions.

Obviously in such a situation, conflicting stories are told about the part played by each faction in the struggle, and the various versions of Sheikh Mahmud's career form no exception. Any evaluation of the practical and moral virtues of his activities is outside the present scope, and must be based on much fuller evidence than is available at present. What is of interest in this context is mainly the foundations of his power and the form of his control in the area.

Economic basis. From the modest beginnings in Bekas times, the family's economic power was progressively enhanced. The possibilities inherent in the Ottoman practice of land registration seem to have been utilized. After closer relations had been established with the Sultan, the Sheikhs were able to gain control over numerous villages by buying the land at very low rates from the government. A major source of revenue that made this type of transaction possible was the ownership of the Bazaar (market district) of Sulaimani (main valley, 1/4 of the Bazaar belongs to the Sheikh family vs. 1/4 municipally owned). In addition to its economic importance, this also enabled the family in effect to control the city of Sulaimani. The Sheikh family thus became one of the three major landowning groups in the area. It should however be pointed out that in spite of nearly continuous expansion of property, the whole Sheikh family today owns less land than *one* member of the *Jaf Brigade* alone (Hamza Beg of Halabja). Thus Sheikh Mahmud's political supremacy did not derive directly from ownership; landed property merely offered the necessary economic foundation for his political activity.

Semi-sacred position. As descendants of the Prophet, the Sheikh family is considered to be vested with certain supernatural powers, derived secondarily from the sainted ancestor Koka Hamma. This gives Sheikh Mahmud the specific power to make amulets that

• [illegible] possess the bearer from bullets and knives. The amulet consists of a number of Koranic sayings; it is sewed up in a triangle of cloth of specified color, and fitted pinned to the shoulder, in the hair, or suspended by a string around the neck or under one arm. If occasionally the bearer of such an amulet is killed by knife or bullet, this can easily be explained, since the protective power is not operative while the person is thinking bad thoughts or if he loses his temper in battle. Stories proving the efficacy of the amulets are valid: a bullet has been found around the neck of a master, and no matter how hard they tried, competent marksmen were unable to shoot the bird.

Charisma. The personal charisma attached to Shaikh Mahmud is rather difficult to separate from his semi-sacred powers, and in part springs directly from them. He is endowed with the ability to read a person's thoughts and character; he knows before a word is spoken for what purpose a person has come to him. A certain delight in other people's uneasiness and a taste for tricks and practical jokes further contributes to his ordinary, semi-sacred reputation. Last but not least, he also strikes a Western visitor by his extraordinary personality and force of character.

The failure of his charismatic mission to succeed must be ascribed primarily to external rather than local factors. Towards the end of the First World War, contact was established between Shaikh Mahmud and the Indian Army in Mesopotamia, and, after being given informal promises of Kurdish independence, Shaikh Mahmud chose to shift his loyalties from the Turks to the British. He proclaimed himself King, thus in a sense re-establishing the form of the Baban Feudality, and perhaps hoping to emerge as the leader of all of Kurdistan. By the treaty of Lausanne, Allied plans were reversed, and numerous conflicts over the question of Kurdish independence continued in the area till 1932. Some of these conflicts derived from institutional developments, others were rather unnecessary. It is indeed surprising that the British administration should chose E. B. Soane as their agent in the area, and the person to cooperate with Shaikh Mahmud — Soane who, due to personal experiences with before the war makes the most highly emotional attacks on Shaikh

Mahmud in his book (Barth, op. cit.), published well before his appointment. Such personal antipathy between the two leading figures could only make the struggle more bitter and a compromise more difficult to reach.

The formal organization accomplished by Shaikh Mahmud for his larger domains never had time to take shape, and by now it is claimed to have been in accordance with recent Western principles. The *apolitimeyo* pattern of the early 1950s was along traditional feudal lines — he is said to have travelled around with a large army, living off the lands as he passed through the various districts he administered. A suggestion of some of the patterns and institutions may be observed today.

At present, Shaikh Mahmud lives in the small village Durkeili south and west of Sakkinani[1]). He is surrounded by a group of retainers paralleling the *Jul Bagi' Pychimada* in form and function, but recruited along more irregular lines. A typical escape for a young man who has become inextricably involved in feud or has other strong reason to leave his village is to join a feudal lord of Shaikh Mahmud's type, buying security by being the follower of an important leader, and in return serving in the leader's private police force. The Shaikh thus has a group of men who depend on him for protection and livelihood, and may use them to enforce his control over the villages he owns. His opponents like to make veiled accusations that this group that is used to tyrannize minor leaders of others wears flowered uniforms, such stories do not serve to reduce the value of his friendship or the weight of his words.

Friendly relations with leaders and groups outside the Shaikh's immediate control are reinforced through contacts on the major festival days of the Islamic year, when Durkeili is a bustling bee-hive full of embroidered robes and flying rockets, and the Shaikh himself is constantly active in these separate reception rooms. Furthermore,

[1]) It should be noted that Shaikh Mahmud denies taking any part in power politics, and the following in no way contradicts his statement. The activities described were simply to perpetuate his prestige, and are of interest in the present connection only by virtue of the parallelism in the mechanisms used in securing prestige and in reinforcing a power position.

• (49, 199) obligations are commonly created by liberal gifts («He made from the poor and gives to the rich» in the words of one critic).

Such institutionalized or regularized means of creating and establishing relations of dependence are very parallel to those used by the leaders in the traditional tribal political organization, and illustrate how the charismatic leader attempts to utilize traditional symbols and institutions. It is also striking how the importance of the charismatic leader extends to the limit of the previous, disorganized unit — here the Beles Pashalik — and no further. It is very doubtful that Shaikh Mahmoud ever had any appreciable following outside the districts of Southern Kurdistan.

Personal charisma being important even in the traditional system, it plays a tremendous role in a situation of disorganization, and may survive a series of defeats. Characteristic is the comment by numerous Hamawands, whose country in fact was annihilated in the Shaikh's defeat: «We will support the Shaikh, and if he wants to fight, we will serve him again.»

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labour-owner [illegible] absentee landowner, differs radically from that generally associated with tribal organization, which includes relatively few labour and/or lineage, and a majority of freeholding farmers.

The incompatibility of categories from these two [illegible] evidence, as is the tendency for the hierarchy embodying most power — i. e. the more highly capitalized organization headed by the landowner — to replace the other. The absentee landowner who owns only part of the land of a village, will find his powers greatly impaired by the co-existence of freeholding farmers with his tenants in the land community. The sanctions by which he disciplines his tenants are reduced in effect — eviction from land is less serious, eviction from the village dependent on the vote of villagers outside his control. Similarly, he would be limited in his freedom to evict new farmers on the land by a vote on the part of the freeholding farmers, who could refuse the newcomer village membership. The village headman would almost certainly be elected from among the freeholding farmers, and serve as a counterforce of opposition to the landowner, etc. etc. The landowner, occupying the part-status that embodies most power in the situation of conflicting interests will tend to apply his powers to eliminate the incompatible status category — in this case by buying or forcibly taking over the proprietary rights on the remaining land, and giving the formerly freeholding farmers tenant status.

Where the right to eviction, and in fact the final powers of decision in all village matters, are taken away from the formerly freeholding farmer group, it becomes impossible for it to control a class of Modjos serfs, and this status group is similarly eliminated, and presumably assimilated as tenant farmers of lower status, following from their lower wealth.

A second major agent of change, or at times a concomitant of [illegible] economic changes, is the factor of modification of the administrative system by external administration. The tribal administrative mechanisms, based on consanguineal kinship-personal loyalties, has been discussed above (pp. 49 ff). Where external administration — large absentee landowner or central government alike — enters and

enforce its decisions by coercive means, the powers of tribal administration break down, and a transfer of loyalties will tend to result — e. g. as in the case of the Mossi (see, cf. p. 126.

At the time of the Boko Fulbeli, the capitalist landowner was of less importance, and general administration was along traditional lines. The Boko Fulbe utilized the principles of indirect rule, essential to the application of a feudal system to an area of ethnic mixture. Though general administration thus was a less active agent in producing destabilization, it was still operative. The Boko Fulbe lent power to the traditional leaders in their hierarchy, and supported many of their decisions by coercive means. To the nomadic groups, this was less necessary, since the necessity and functions of an organizing leader are obvious to all members of the community. In the settled communities, the need for a coordinator is less obvious to the individual member of the group, and the leader's authority will be more readily questioned. Either a constant process of suppression must be operative, as among the Hamarwuda, or the family leader type of leader can not retain control. External administration, however, has vested interests in retaining status quo and avoiding conflicts, and therefore applies its powers to resist fission of groups. Thus the close kinship unity of the local group is lost, and tribal organization is weakened. At the same time, external administration wishes to have a clear and moderately constant leader to deal with, and will thus attempt to strengthen the power of the leader and stabilize his position, to counteract these disorganizing tendencies. Thus it becomes necessary to vest the leader with coercive means, and this leads to the complete breakdown of the traditional tribal lineage organization.

The predominance of non-tribal communities in the area under direct Boko control must be seen as the cumulative effect of centuries of centralized rule, where such factors would be operative. It should also be remembered that any movement of people — except where it occurs in larger blocks — alienates the migrant from his hereditary kin group, and places him in a non-tribal system of administration wherever he chooses to settle, since there is no mechanism by which he may be adopted into a new lineage.

Thus a fairly clear dichotomy can be made in Kurdish territory between tribal areas, in which lineages form the basis for the political structures, and lineage groups correspond directly to territorial groups; and on the other hand non-tribal areas, where the territorial group forms the sole basis of organization in a semi-feudal system, and, though descent and kinship are important, any type of lineage organization is absent.

Though this change from tribal to non-tribal organization seems, as far as any specific community is concerned, to be a road of no return, and there has been a constant destabilization process going on through time, the actual border between the areas where tribal vs. feudal organizations predominate has remained moderately constant for many generations, with apparently only minor oscillations. This must be seen as a steady state, where the rate of population movement — in tribal blocks or segments of such — from the mountains towards and into the plains roughly compensated for the formerly slow rate of breakdown in tribal organization along the zone of contact with external administration.

This rough balance has been completely upset by the changes following the First World War. The rate of destabilization has been tremendously speeded up by modern communications, reaching into the mountain fastness and most distant valleys; external administration has pacified all the old tribal strongholds; and movements of groups across the border from Persia are prevented or at least seriously hampered. It is thus only a question of time, probably less than a generation, till the segmentary lineage type of tribal organization is completely replaced by the non-tribal type in Southern Kurdistan.

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Mahabad

668 The fall of Tabriz was the cue for Qazi Mohammad to declare
his own area independent — which it had long been in fact. On
• 692 December 15 at a meeting in Mahabad attended by tribal chiefs,
the leaders of the new Kurdish Democrat Party, Mulla Mustafa,
and three Soviet officers in a jeep and armed with tommy-guns,
he solemnly inaugurated the Kurdish People's Government and
raised the Kurdish flag. A national parliament of thirteen mem-
bers was formed, and on January 22, 1946, Qazi Mohammad was
elected president of the new republic. The Minister of War was
his cousin, Mohammad Hosein Khan Seif Qazi, a merchant whose
military reputation rested on his honorary rank of captain in the
Iranian gendarmerie. Seif Qazi, Mulla Mustafa, Amer Khan
Shikak, Hama Rashid Khan Bassi (just returned from Iraq
with his tribesmen), and Zaro Beg Harki • received the rank of
"marshal," and were provided with Soviet uniforms, complete
with high boots, stiff shoulder-straps, and red-banded garrison
caps.'

578 The new government, which controlled only a minute territory
668 including the towns of Mahabad, Bukan, Naqadeh, and Ush-
nuieh, sent observers to the opening of the Azerbaijan National
Parliament and even convoked a miniature parliament of its own.
It also dispatched Mulla Mustafa south to fight the Iranian garri-
sons in Saqqiz, Banah, and Sardasht, cut off from each other and
their base in Sarandaj by the heavy winter snows.

RELATIONS WITH TABRIZ AND TEHRAN

Meanwhile in the north the capture of Rezaieh by the Azer-
baijani Democrats brought new problems to the Kurdish govern-
ment. Although the majority of the inhabitants of the plains were

777 [illegible]
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689
695 [illegible]

[illegible]

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Mahabad

668 The Kurds were repulsed, however, in an attack on the Mah-
724 mudabad Pass near Saqqiz, designed to cut the Sanandaj Road, and again later after they had seized the hills overlooking Saqqiz. The Iranian army drove them off and erected round watch-towers of mud on the mountain, each manned by thirty or forty soldiers. Finally a truce was effected whereby Iranian officers were exchanged,* each side was to stay within its lines, and the Kurds were to have the right to inspect vehicles going from Saqqiz to Bonab and Sardasht and to stop arms and ammunition from reaching the Iranian garrisons there. The Shikak and the Herki returned to the north.

CHARACTER OF QAZI MOHAMMAD AND THE KURDISH REPUBLIC

NIC 609 After this period of conflict, Qazi Mohammad drew aside his iron curtain and gave non-Soviet observers a chance to look at his country. Although feeling against the British on account of the expulsion of the Barzanis from Iraq, Soviet-sponsored anti-British propaganda, and certain events in the past in which the Kurds considered they had been victims of British oppression, was too strong to permit them to visit the tiny Kurdish Republic, at various times four Americans and one Frenchman were guests of Qazi Mohammad.

These observers found the Kurdish Republic to be a going concern. Although destitute of any legal basis whatsoever, Qazi Mohammad's *de facto* government continued as before, changing only the title of its ministers from *wazir* (minister) to *rais* (chief). Qazi Mohammad himself became merely the leader of the party (Pishewa-i-Hizb-i-Dimokrat-i-Kurd). The villages were run by their old landlords and tribal leaders with the aid of a gendarmerie locally recruited and dressed in Kurdish costume, but commanded by officers from Mahabad with Soviet uniforms. Mahabad itself, from a typically drab Persian provincial town, had become picturesque and colorful, its streets thronging with Kurds in national costume, free for the moment of the hated Iranian soldiers and gendarmes.

* 642 621 629

*The Kurdish liaison officer was "Colonel" Mohammad Hosseinieh, one of the original [illegible] who, from 1942 when the Russians were about to withdraw from Iran, had been [illegible]

valuation of the Kurdish factor. From the cultural point of view the Kurds were still an unwritten sheet of paper. Soviet Russia, so the communist strategists may have argued, thus stood the chance of exercising paramount influence on the development and the character of a future Kurdish culture, if she only tried.

The raw material for such a Soviet experiment was the small Kurdish minority in Transcaucasia. The exact number of the Kurds in Soviet Russia is as difficult to ascertain as their number in any other country. Officially Russia had only 54,700 Kurds in 1926 and 45,800 in 1939, but unofficial pre-war data recorded as many as 80,000, of whom 40,000 were in Azerbaidzhan, 23,000 in Armenia and the rest in Georgia and Turkmenistan. Only in Armenia and Azerbaidzhan were the Kurds a political problem.

For a long time neither Azerbaidzhani nor Armenian communists seemed to have grasped the importance of the Kurds within the framework of a far-sighted Soviet policy in the Middle East. They either neglected the Kurdish minorities living in their respective republics or even tried to deprive them of their national character.

The Armenian communists disliked the Kurds in view of the role which the latter had played in the Armenian massacres, and thus showed not the slightest interest in their well-being and their mobilization for the Soviet State. Kurds in Armenia were not entrusted with political and social work, no skilled workers were recruited from among them and Kurdish peasants were not even organized into collective farms.[36] In 1936, the Soviet central Government strongly reprimanded the Armenian communists for letting national animosities interfere with their Kurdish policy.

All the mistakes which local Transcaucasian authorities committed in handling the Kurdish question in the inter-war period proved to be unimportant at a moment when Russia was able to use the Kurdish issue on a big scale. Her success in handling the problem was then indisputable. Colonel W. G. Elphinston, who was in charge of Kurdish affairs as a British Middle East Intelligence Officer, said that the effects of propaganda in the Kurdish language originating in the Kurdish community in the U.S.S.R. made themselves felt as far away as Syria, and communist pamphlets in Kurdish penetrated as far as Cairo.[37]

The Kurdish group outside the U.S.S.R. most directly affected by Russian policy and propaganda were the Persian Kurds whose country was occupied by the Red Army between 1941 and 1946. The Soviet occupation authorities did not spread communist ideas among the Kurds; they did not propagate collectivization and nationalization. All they aimed at was to make the Kurds respectful to Soviet Russia, the Russian Army and Stalin. The Kurdish Republic set up with Russian help in 1946 under Qazi Muhammad as Prime Minister was a national

[36] Ibid. vol. 116, pp. 250–251, FO 371/Soviet Union — Analyst]

Kurdish State and not communist. It existed for only nine months, despite its Treaty of Alliance for twenty years which it had concluded with another Soviet-sponsored government, the autonomous administration of Persian Azerbaidzhan.

Even such short-lived experiments as the Kurdish Republic of 1946 can become an important factor in the national tradition of a people, who, like the Kurds, are living under foreign rule. Experiments of that kind are apt to create a myth which ultimately may have a greater impact on the national development of the people than the original event itself. From year to year the Kurdish Republic of Qazi Mohammed may appear to the Kurds more splendid and more powerful, particularly if Soviet propaganda does its share by reminding the Kurds of the downfall of 'their' republic and recalling the part which Russia played in its foundation. Soviet propaganda is indeed taking every opportunity of referring back to the glorious times when two pictures decorated the walls of the houses of many a Kurdish sheikh – that of Qazi Mohammed, the Kurdish leader, hanged by the Persians in March 1947, and that of Generalissimo Stalin.[66]

Despite the collapse of 'Free Kurdistan' Soviet Russia has nevertheless made great progress in mastering the Kurdish problem. Kurdish chieftains became acquainted with Soviet institutions and Soviet ideology while the Russian occupation of Persia's Kurdish territories lasted. Many Persian Kurds joined their countrymen already living in Soviet Transcaucasia and Kurdish culture 'national in form and socialist in content' developed: 200 Kurdish pamphlets and books had been published in the Soviet Union by 1949.[67] Nor was there any shortage of qualified Kurdish personnel in the Soviet Union after the war. On the contrary, Soviet propaganda was able to boast of Kurdish 'state dignitaries and outstanding workers in culture and science', who had sprung up among the Russian Kurds. A Kurdish Soviet poet, Amin Avdal, is the 'author of wonderful verses on the Soviet homeland'. Another Kurdish poet, Jasmeh Jalil, translated Russian classics into his native tongue. A Kurdish philologist, Nure Pulatova, a graduate of Leningrad University, became the only Kurdish woman scholar in the world.[68] And lastly, between 1946 and 1950 the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. included a Kurdish deputy, Semand Alievich Siabandov.

However important the recent Soviet experiments with the Russian Kurds may be, the latter represent not even 5 per cent of the entire Kurdish people. Soviet Russia must bring either the Turkish or the Persian Kurds within her orbit if she wants to make a success of her 'Kurdish policy'. It remains to be seen whether the political dynamic of the U.S.S.R. and the ideological power of Bolshevism will be sufficient to accomplish this aim.